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Liz Morrish and The Analogue University Writing Collective 
Abstract 
In an era of neoliberal reforms, academics in UK universities have become increasingly 
enmeshed in audit, particularly of research ‘outputs’. Driving a new ethos of competition has 
been the increasing influence of university league tables, and the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) which governs the distribution of one tranche of research money to 
institutions. More recently, though, institutions have set in place strategies to achieve 
institutional goals of REF scores and enhanced league table position by means of individual 
‘performance’ targets.  
There has been considerable slippage between the individualised practices of research audit 
in universities and the policies of performance management to the point where we now 
recognise ‘management by metrics’ as a totalizing force. This has been very successful in 
constructing docile bodies for the corporate academy. Academic workloads, performance 
appraisals, teaching evaluations, but particularly the anticipatory REF preparations have been 
‘weaponized’ – turned over to management to function as tools of reward, but more often 
punishment. Our contention is that metrics construct us all as disposable, interchangeable 
labour inputs whose human capital is deployed at the pleasure of the managers. 
Using the data of performance management and training documents, this paper firstly offers 
an analysis of the role of discourse in redefining the meaning of research, and in colonizing a 
new kind of entrepreneurial, corporate academic. This discourse is designed to construct new 
corporate identities which align with the priorities of academic capitalism; it is a discourse 
which is designed to shape a cautious academic whose access to academic advancement is 
contingent upon adopting a new mode of being.  
In the second part of the paper, we narrate a case study of resistance to management by 
metrics. In 2015, Newcastle University managers introduced a new set of research 
‘expectations’ known as ‘Raising the Bar’. In addition to the expectation that internationally 
excellent and world leading research could be produced by all academics, there were 
individual financial targets for grant capture. These expectations were applied across all 
subjects, although financial targets were ‘benchmarked for subject norms’.  
The academic body at Newcastle were able to act collectively to resist Raising the Bar. This 
resistance started with a meeting which identified the issue as one of excessive expectations 
and a level of surveillance which would distort priorities and undermine academic autonomy. 
The collective refused the imposition of individual targets and refused to subordinate 
academic values to financial ones. There was a successful negotiation with management, and 
in July 2016, Raising the Bar was rescinded in favour of collegial action to work towards 
research improvement. This paper documents key stages in the process, and offers some 
principles for organising against management by metrics.  
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Title page sentence 
This article responds to a need for evidence-based research into strategies for resisting the 
imposition of neoliberal structures such as outcomes-based performance management, and 
attempts by university management to colonise academic identities.  
 
Keywords: Neoliberalism, resistance, performance management, outcomes, targets, metrics, 
audit culture, academic identities, critical discourse analysis. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the neoliberal era, academics in UK universities have become increasingly enmeshed in 
systems of metrics. These have moved beyond audit (Strathern, 2000), to the recasting of 
identities as universities enact markets (Burrows, 2012), and increasingly to the situation in 
which data itself has become a new exchange value and thus productive of new subjectivities 
(The Analogue University, 2017).  
 
Driving a new ethos of competition has been the growing influence of university league 
tables, and in the UK the Research Excellence Framework (REF) which governs the 
distribution of one tranche of government research money. In an attempt to game this system, 
institutions have set in place strategies to achieve institutional goals of enhanced national and 
international league table positions by setting ‘performance’ targets for their staff. Described 
as The Metric Tide, in a 2015 report for the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE), the chair of the review body, James Wilsdon, cautioned against the misuse of 
metrics as a tool of research assessment or management in UK higher education. He wrote; 
“Metrics hold real power: they are constitutive of values, identities and livelihoods.” Yet 
despite such critiques and a widespread awareness that outcomes-based performance-
management in the public sector inadvertently produces a whole set of negative outcomes 
(Lowe & Wilson, 2015), university managers, like the proverbial rabbits trapped in car 
headlights, seem unable to escape their lure and logic. At the same time, although they 
critique these developments, academics can often feel despondent or even helpless in the face 
of them. We might know that the “there is no alternative” argument is untrue, but we can 
often be hard-pressed to point to successful instances of resistance and the embrace of 
workable alternatives.  
 
In this article, we critically examine a recent dispute about one such example of that 
outcomes-based performance-management, that of ‘Raising the Bar’ (RTB), introduced by 
management at Newcastle University, England. By attempting to channel staff energies into 
what counts highest in those audit exercises, RTB was explicitly designed to game the system 
to position the university better in national and international league tables. It sought to do this 
by a ‘carrot and stick’ approach: rewarding academics deemed likely to improve the 
university’s rankings in competition with others, and disciplining those deemed to be 
underperforming in the key metrics. Although this has become a common story in the 
Anglophone world in recent years, academics at Newcastle were able to successfully resist 
RTB leading to its withdrawal. RTB is worth studying in detail not only because it is a classic 
example of that outcomes-based performance-management in higher education, but also 
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because it provides clues as to how the seemingly relentless march of neoliberal values can 
be resisted.  
 
The article’s purpose, therefore, is to illustrate the growing literatures on the logics and 
effects on academics of neoliberal that outcomes-based performance-management in 
universities, and extend the scant literature on how it can be successfully contested. It is 
based on archival work, discourse analysis of key documents, and interviews with 27 
members of the university from senior managers to union activists. We begin by setting out 
how calculative practices and neoliberal discourse generate new forms of academic identities. 
We then move to the Newcastle example, providing a critical analysis of management 
discourse, piecing together a timeline of the RTB dispute, and drawing from this an analysis 
of strategies of resistance. We conclude by arguing that the neoliberalisation of universities is 
not inevitable and can be successfully resisted by academics through collective efforts that 
draw upon one of the keystones of academic identity – the ability to tell truth to power. We 
hope that this research will be of value to other academic collectives facing similar struggle.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: NEOLIBERAL DISCOURSE AND ACADEMIC IDENTITIES 
 
The spread of calculative practices (Ritzer, 1993) has emerged in a context in which 
universities have been increasingly compelled to justify their existence in economic terms. 
This has taken place within a wider political landscape of neoliberalism described by Graeber 
(2012) as a form of capitalism which has systematically prioritised political imperatives of 
competition, entrepreneurialism, and the supremacy of the market over economic ones 
(Harvey 2005). These priorities become embedded in cultures and institutions rather than 
economies (Brown, 2015). In universities, the resonances of this ideological project have 
been apparent in the installation of the twin sisters of neoliberalism: New Public Management 
(Deem, Hillyard, & Reed, 2007), and managerialism (Hoyle & Wallace, 2005). We have seen 
a shift to neoliberal ideology which is manifest in a culture of audit in which every aspect of 
work and ‘the business’ is assessed by its calculative value.  
 
The following are familiar characteristics of the higher education landscape in 2017: 
 
• Students (and staff) are located within a framework of human capital (Becker, 1994), 
• Higher education is re-visioned as a project of acquiring skills which can be justified 
in terms of economic benefit (Holmwood, 2017), 
• There is an emphasis on individual benefit, such as ‘value for money’ and ‘return on 
investment’ (US Government, Department for Education, No Date),  
• Degrees are viewed internally as ‘products’ requiring ‘business cases’ (Fenton, 2011), 
• Students are positioned as ‘customers (Molesworth et al., 2009; Williams, 2013),’  
• Students are seen as units of profit via fees, halls of residence, sports facilities, 
branded goods, graduation (Molesworth et al., 2011; Brown & Caruso, 2013). 
 
In order to achieve this transformation, all who study and work in universities need to be 
made to comply with this view of themselves as units of productivity, profit or consumption. 
This requires a reshaping of the identities and declared motivations of these individuals and it 
is achieved through what Fairclough (2010) has called the technologization of discourse - a 
calculated intervention in discursive practices in order to effect social change.  
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For example, US universities are ranked on ‘Return on Investment’. Return on Investment in 
the new US College Scorecard (US Dept. Education) is determined by the likelihood of a 
high-paying job for graduates of a particular college or university. Colleges and courses are 
ranked according to the likely salaries obtained by graduates, and this in turn becomes part of 
the college marketing narrative. This particular metric of graduate salaries, known as 
Longitudinal Educational Outcomes data, has just reached the UK in 2017 (HEFCE, 2017; 
Boys, 2017) along with the passing of the Higher Education and Research Act, 2017. This 
indicates the extent to which the ideological penetration of neoliberal ideas has been very 
successful in UK public services, and in higher education in particular. In 2017, any 
academic who hopes to progress in their career is forced to submit to academic capitalism 
(Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) and the marketization of the self. When the university is 
constructed as a revenue-making enterprise, the individuals within it must also subordinate 
themselves to the profit motive. Increasingly, academics are required to defray their own 
salaries with grant income, and as we see below, some universities are making this a factor of 
performance management.   
 
This is the kind of logic which prioritises the cost of research over its content or intrinsic 
worth. Equally, this logic is sustained by a discourse which reframes achievement and the 
parameters of the possible entirely within economic and calculable terms. In the ‘Data 
University’ academic identities are so recast that scholars themselves desire data: for 
example, devising strategies to maximise followers on venture-capital sites such as 
Academia.edu, or mentioning the value of a grant on their websites rather than telling us the 
objectives of the research program (Analogue University, 2017). Entrepreneurship has gone 
from metaphor, to a state in which it is both literal and mandatory. Indeed, in some academic 
job descriptions it is stated as a ‘key competency’ and has even given rise to completely new 
academic identities. Figure 1 shows a job advertisement was placed in January 2015 and was 
a cause of mystified comment in the higher education press. What it betokens, though, is a 
person who can somehow be guaranteed to inspire or occasion the advent of discovery – as if 
this can be summoned up by mere aspiration, rather than, say, financial support, continuity 
and security of employment, freedom to fail and other necessities of successful science. 
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Figure 1: Bristol University Associate Dean of Eureka Moments. 2015.  
[https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/01/26/associate-dean-eureka-moments].  
 
We see an increasing narrowing of these latter opportunities in UK academia. What has come 
to be known as the accelerated academy (Carrigan, 2015) is all about process and targets, and 
we now face a future in which employees are established in a shifting hierarchy according to 
metrics. In this that outcomes-based performance-management (Lowe & Wilson, 2015), there 
is typically little value accorded to what is actually accomplished; instead there is an overly-
scrupulous fixation with accountability, monitoring and reporting, and with what Power 
(1999) has described as “rituals of verification.” Indeed, the measures proliferate, mirrored by 
institutional compliance regimes – and gaming practices - to ensure success. The following 
obligatory audits have come to arrest academic energies to a degree which overshadows the 
principal functions of a university, namely teaching, scholarship and research:  
• National Student Survey – a student survey of their satisfaction with courses. It asks 
final year students to give scores for how interesting they find the course, clarity of 
marking criteria, speed of feedback and access to tutorial support. These figures are 
used in calculating league tables of universities. The actual satisfaction score is very 
high at over 85 per cent average. 
• Research Excellence Framework (REF) – a 6 yearly audit of research outputs, and 
impact. 
• The forthcoming Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) – student retention and 
progression rates, satisfaction rates and graduate salaries. These are assumed by the 
current UK government to stand as proxy measures of good teaching. 
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Scores for departments, and even individuals, for each of these aspects of research, NSS and 
TEF measures will be compiled on the vice-chancellor’s dashboard, and some commercial 
models have now been adopted by UK and US universities (figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Academic Analytics. (No date). Benchmarking for academic excellence. 
http://www.academicanalytics.com/ 
 
Academics working in the UK, US or Australia, are commonly monitored by a similar system 
of academic analytics. We inhabit a ‘watching culture’ (Mather & Seifert, 2014) and 
increasingly we notice an elision of audit, performance management and disciplinary 
procedures to the point where the latter becomes normalised and expected. There is anecdotal 
evidence that universities are using performance management and disciplinary procedures 
more promiscuously and punitively than ever before. Failure to meet management 
expectations of ‘performance’ will result in the public humiliation of some ‘improving 
performance procedure,’ and possible demotion to a lower grade or a teaching-only contract. 
No accrual of reputation can be permitted; the criteria must be met every year, not just over 
the course of a distinguished career. In this way, any prestige associated with the rank of 
Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Reader or Professor must be considered temporary, as is its tenure. 
Just as we have a growing casualised sector of contingent labour in universities, all 
academics may soon be made to join this expanding precariat.  
 
It is not a great step from accepting the logic of the market, to seeing one’s own academic 
worth reduced to a bundle of metrics. Those metrics may shift quite abruptly, and so 
measures of success are never stabilised. The discourse reveals a focus on competition, 
finance and a preoccupation with ‘excellence’ – another semantically unanchored concept 
(Moore et al., 2017). The discourse also installs clear limits to what can be considered 
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research or even work, but the threshold of achievement is rising out of reach of many 
talented academics. This is a recipe for and despondency and burnout in the workplace (Gill, 
2010).  
 
As we have indicated, there is much literature which features moving and sophisticated 
critiques of these processes, however, the literature analysing successful cases of resistance to 
them in specific case studies is scarce. This article seeks to address that in its study of 
Newcastle University, England.  
 
METHODS: Analysing Raising the Bar at Newcastle University 
 
In October 2015, at the start of 2015-16 academic year, senior managers in Newcastle 
University emailed each academic staff member a document entitled ‘Research and 
Innovation Performance Expectations’ (RiPE). These expectations – on grant income 
obtained, top-rated publications, and graduate student completions – were a key element of 
‘Raising the Bar’, the Vice Chancellor’s programme of improving Newcastle University’s 
position in league tables. The remainder of this article traces and analyses the genesis of that 
document and the dispute which led to its withdrawal at the end of the academic year.  
Our evidence and arguments are drawn from three sources. Firstly, discourse analysis of 
RiPE via its key documents; and also of a presentation by the Vice Chancellor, Chris Brink, 
in a ‘town hall’ event on RTB which Liz Morrish attended. Secondly, we collected and 
analysed archival sources of minutes of the university Executive Board, RTB Steering Group, 
Senate, Council, University and College Union and other relevant sources, looking for all 
references to RTB. Finally, the article draws on a number of interviews conducted by The 
Analogue University, a writing collective of Newcastle academics. In the course of 
conducting research on RTB, we interviewed 20 middle managers such as Heads of 
Academic Units and senior managers (Executive Board) and lay members (Court and 
Council) of the university, and 7 University and College Union activists. The interviews were 
semi-structured and were aimed at understanding the genesis of the RTB discourse and the 
unfolding of the dispute, with a focus on understanding why RTB was withdrawn. Although 
the Analogue University authors were involved in the dispute as activists, we have not drawn 
on our own ethnographic experiences for this article. 
For analysis, we adopted an Interpretative Policy Analysis approach to discourse analysis of 
documents, interview transcripts and ethnographic observations, to chart both key points of 
divergence and also the prevalent precepts and understandings in groups of management and 
activists (Fischer 2003, Glynos et al., 2009). 
 
A word on our positionality. The origins of our collaboration go back to November 15 2015, 
when Liz Morrish visited Newcastle at the invitation of the local branch of the UK 
academics’ trade union, the University and College Union. Based on her scholarly expertise 
in this field, Morrish provided a critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010) of the RiPE 
documents and also made a semi-covert study of the Vice Chancellor’s ‘town hall’ 
presentation of RTB to Newcastle academics. The Analogue University is a writing collective 
formed of Newcastle academics who became active in the dispute. This is thus not a 
disinterested study by remote scholars, as we began with the assumption that the current UK 
version of neoliberalism has an adverse effect on universities. Nonetheless, by focussing our 
interviews on heavily on managers and senior lay members (20) rather than activists (7), and 
by immersing ourselves in university documents, we sought to be directed wherever the data 
would take us: we had a genuine desire to understand what led to the withdrawal of RTB 
from the perspective of the managers who made the decisions, rather than activists. 
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In the remaining sections of this article, we analyse this data. In the next section we analyse 
the discourses used in RTB documents. The following section discusses the course of the 
dispute, and finally we seek to understand what lessons can be derived from it. 
 
 THE DISCOURSE OF PERFORMANCE: WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
 
In this section, we begin our analysis of RTB by identifying and unpacking the 
presuppositions encoded in the Research and Innovation Performance Expectations (RiPE) 
document which framed the substantive performance management element of RTB. A 
different set of RiPE metrics was produced for each of Newcastle’s three faculties, but the 
general principal and covering letter was the same. Quotations below, appearing in italics, are 
drawn from this document. 
 
It should be observed from the outset that Raising the Bar is a coercively innocent phrase. It 
conveniently conceals all the judgement, hostility, pain and pressure that academics at 
Newcastle knew would follow its deployment. It is striking that Chris Brink resorted to a 
sports metaphor in naming his strategy. The scheme was initiated by managerial anxiety, 
amidst chatter about so-called ‘bottom Russellers’ that Newcastle had been “lacking in 
competitiveness compared to other Russell Group institutions” [the Russell Group is a 
collective of leading, longer-established UK universities] (Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences Research and Innovation Performance Expectations, p1).  
 
RiPE refers to [T]he expectations on research active staff – makes clear that if you do not 
meet these, you are not research active, regardless of any evidence to substantiate other kinds 
of performance. Significantly, these are expectations, not objectives, nor targets, nor goals. 
Expectations are finite, concrete and measurable, so by definition, if staff do not meet them, 
they cannot be considered research active. A justification is offered for the turn to metrics: 
This document is focussed on research performance…..as this will determine our ranking in 
the next REF. However, a new understanding of ‘performance’ itself is at issue. The key to 
this new definition, we learn, will be increasing the number of research outputs graded at the 
REF 4* level (internationally excellent) (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Research 
and Innovation Performance Expectations, p1). The actual academic value of the scholarly 
enquiry cannot be measured, and so will be disregarded. The parameters of ‘performance’ are 
drawn so rigidly as to circumscribe any kind of professional autonomy, or even what counts 
as academic labour, guaranteeing that much of what academics do will be rendered invisible. 
The whole endeavour of research, so personal and integral to academic identity, is collapsed 
into the term output. This is a designation which itself excludes as much as it includes, 
inasmuch as only those works which are, firstly, REF submissable, and secondly, judged to 
be internationally excellent or world-leading can be considered within its scope. There is also 
some duplicitous reasoning evident: [W]e have largely relied on REF 2014 entry as a proxy 
for reaching the minimum expectations for research outputs (Faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences Research and Innovation Performance Expectations, p2). This is a post hoc 
reckoning. The strategy was introduced after the REF 2014 exercise had been concluded. It 
seems contradictory to assess a scholar’s current ‘productivity’ on the basis of past 
performance. And in any case, how would a local assessor know if an individual’s outputs 
were scored as the quoted minimum 3* (internationally excellent)? Individual REF scores are 
categorically not available; they have been destroyed (HEFCE REF FAQ, 2014). But once 
again, this is a discursive attempt to construct new academic binary identities: those who 
were submitted to the REF, and those who were not.  
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A criterion for a chair is someone who: aspires to be in the top quartile in UoA [Unit of 
Assessment] for income, or aspiring to 4* (world leading) (Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences Research and Innovation Performance Expectations, p2), which begs the question, 
how can everyone be in the top quartile? With success rates for research council grants as low 
as 12 per cent (Matthews, 2016), then that is an expectation one will probably not meet, but 
the invitation to appraise oneself against that benchmark is as much discursive as it is 
statistically illiterate. Managers are aware of the academic predisposition to overwork and to 
self-scrutiny, and so the coercion need only be implied in the requirement to aspire. If 
expressing the aspiration itself is an adequate indicator, then its limits will never be exhausted 
in an audit environment of shifting and expanding goals. 
 
Objectification and unattainable targets 
The use in universities of metaphors and analogies borrowed from business and management 
has irked many academics including the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan 
Williams, who identified a ‘new barbarity’ in the ‘corrupting’ language of the research 
excellence framework (REF) in which academic scholarship and research is collapsed into 
the process metaphor of ‘outputs’ (Annual Lecture to the Council for the Defence of British 
Universities, January 2015). If we need evidence that targets and performance management 
cause insupportable stress, we should remember the tragic case of Stefan Grimm who took 
his own life after being threatened with performance management procedures at Imperial 
College (Parr, 2015). The coroner found Stefan’s death to have been ‘needless’ and Imperial 
College said that ‘wider lessons’ would be learned.  
 
Universities in the UK, US, Australia, and other systems which have adopted a neoliberal 
model have become ‘anxiety machines.’ Hall and Bowles (2016) argue that this anxiety is 
intentional and inherent in a system driven by improving performance. In the parodic 
contronyms of management–speak, employees are told that such performance management 
will ‘empower’ them. In the experience of many academics this is not objective setting; 
rather, this is objectification. We can identify several of Martha Nussbaum’s (1995) features 
of objectification (in bold) in the RiPE document: 
 Instrumentality – to be treated as a tool for man’s purposes. According to the 
Newcastle expectations, the function of an academic is to “raise the bar,” increase 
grant income and raise the university’s position in the league tables. 
 This would also entail denial of autonomy – the legitimate activity of an academic 
and what counts as work is tightly defined and controlled in RiPE. Similarly, 
Nussbaum defines ownership as something that can be traded or commodified. As 
long as a scholar continues to produce 4* REF-able outputs in high-impact journals, 
they may be traded on ‘a transfer market’ of superstar professors.  
 There is an avoidance of human agency in the Newcastle documents, signalling 
inertness and abdication of responsibility on the part of management. Grammatical 
subjects include this document, and this aspect of our academic portfolio, a detailed 
analysis of the results and expectations (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 
Research and Innovation Performance Expectations, p1). The passive voice is used 
throughout, with just three instances of an unattributed pronoun ‘we’. ‘We’ is 
inherently ambiguous; it can be used either inclusively, or exclusively of the 
addressee. Looking at the contexts: we do not expect all staff to have equal strengths; 
we have largely relied on REF 2014; we will take early career researcher…rules 
(Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Research and Innovation Performance 
Expectations, p1 &2) – ‘we’ is being used to offer the illusion of inclusivity, while 
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retaining the prerogative of its exclusive attribution to the management of the 
university. 
 
The result of these regulatory systems is that academics are forced to define themselves in 
terms which thwart their ability to express their lived experience outside of the dominant 
managerial paradigm. This is known as illocutionary silencing (Meyerhoff, 2004). Any 
discourse other than that framed by management is deemed impermissible. The academic 
must undergo forcible alignment and compliance with managerial values which ensures that 
all academics must conceive of themselves in neoliberal terms of accountability, 
calculability, and competition. 
 
In the discourse of performance management, perfectly illustrated in RTB, we recognise a 
large degree of semantic instability in words such as ‘performance,’ ‘good’, ‘satisfactory’ etc. 
which means that it will always be possible to claim that there are ‘areas for improvement’ 
(Morrish & Sauntson, 2016). Recent research from Australia on the impact of aggressive 
performance management on early career researchers (Petersen, 2016) has shown that many 
of them “struggled to articulate the value and worth of their work outside the productivity 
discourse” (2016, p.116). The constraints of metrics cause the content of the research to 
change, and researchers attempt to mirror what is ‘hot’ – likely to get funding under the 
shifting priorities of research councils. As Petersen says of her informants, “they and the 
substance of their work become easier to control” (2016, p116). The accelerated academy is 
facilitated by academics who have acquiesced to the fear that their ‘underperformance’ will 
be revealed by the pitiless intrusion of metrics which cannot lie.  
 
THE RAISING THE BAR DISPUTE   
 
The previous section analysed the policy discourse of RTB. In this section, we explore where 
that discourse came from in Newcastle’s institutional history, how it developed, its coercive 
enactment, and resistance to it. Key moments are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Origins of a discourse 
‘Raising the Bar’ was first mentioned in the university Executive Board (EB) minutes in July 
2013, referring to plans to increase the size of university, later called ‘the growth agenda’ 
(EB Minutes, 24/04/2014). In April 2014, the Vice Chancellor, Chris Brink, presented RTB 
to Council as aiming to “Have at least 10 subjects (Units of Assessment) which are ranked 
top 50 in the world” (Chris Brink, ‘Raising the Bar: actions over the next three years, 
28/04/2014).  In January 2015, an RTB Steering Group was established,  which focussed 
RTB down to a two-fold approach to improving performance, by (i) managing individual 
performance through the use of “specific numerical targets” and (ii) the development of a 
Research Excellence Support Framework to “help staff enhance their performance” 
(Executive Board Minutes,3/02/2015). In July, Senate approved the principle (but not details) 
of faculty-specific sets of targets which were eventually called the Research and 
Performance Expectations (RiPE), which were subsequently emailed to staff.   
 
In October 2015, all Heads of Academic Units were called to a meeting and instructed 
immediately to “Embed research expectation for Faculty in all academic recruitment” and 
implement RTB through a Performance Development Review process. This would envisage a 
rapid assessment of each staff member through a red-amber-green traffic light system. Those 
flagged ‘Green’ were to be rewarded, whereas those referred to as “the reds” would be 
subject to an “action plan for improvement” identifying appropriate “support and 
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development” monitored by monthly reports, and eventually leading to the commencement of 
“capability procedure[s]” (Raising the Bar Implementation:  Notes from the meeting held 
with Academic Heads of Unit on 8 October 2015) should progress prove inadequate. One 
middle manager, fiercely critical of RTB, told us that RTB “was sold as making research 
better, but I think it was about trying to get rid of some people.”  
 
Opposition and dénouement  
Although management insisted that that this coercive element was a last resort, as this starkly 
coercive nature of RTB became increasingly clear, unhappiness and unease amongst staff 
mushroomed. Angry debates at staff meetings and fearful corridor conversations amongst 
colleagues genuinely scared for their futures began to harden into action in the run up to the 
Christmas vacation 2015. (We detail these actions as a case study of resistance in the last 
section of this article). The University And College Union branch became increasingly active, 
organising meetings in different units and helping galvanise the opposition to RTB. The 
University And College Union  claimed that RTB was leading to a culture of bullying, and 
asked the  Vice Chancellor to withdraw RiPE and discuss how we could improve research in 
a more collegial way. Groups of academics (at school/ unit level) sent letters to their Pro-
Vice-Chancellors expressing disquiet, and a similar letter signed eventually by 100 professors 
(believed to be a quarter of the professoriate at the time) was delivered to the Vice 
Chancellor. Behind the scenes, Heads of Academic Units increasingly conveyed the disquiet 
of their staff to senior managers. A  University And College Union  branch meeting on 28th 
October 2015 approved an indicative ballot to see whether members would be willing to 
undertake industrial action; in February 2016, the branch indicated its willingness in this 
regard. 
 
The level and breadth of unhappiness over RTB took senior managers unawares: an EB 
member said that when RTB started to go badly wrong, “it genuinely came as a surprise to 
the steering group.” They responded with a series of town hall events, a letter from Chris 
Brink to all staff, and a meeting with representatives of signatories of the professors’ letter. 
The main message was that management had got the tone wrong and poorly communicated 
RTB – which was most expressly not about targets – and that the VC recognised he needed to 
engage more clearly with those people doing research. At the same time, management sought 
to formally engage  University And College Union  in discussion about RTB, and drew up a 
Memorandum of Understanding with  University And College Union  negotiators, which 
recognised that different academics have different strengths that together form units. 
However because management would not backtrack on the linkage between RiPE and 
capability proceedings, a branch meeting in March rejected the Memorandum of 
Understanding. An ACAS (Advisory and Conciliation Service) meeting on 11th May 2016 led 
to a revised- Memorandum of Understanding , rejected by both the  University And College 
Union  branch committee and an Extraordinary General Meeting of the branch on May 23. 
The meeting voted to take Action Short of a Strike in the form of a marking boycott, 
authorised soon after by the University And College Union ’s Higher Education Committee 
to begin on June 3. This would disrupt graduation of final year students, so was a serious 
step. In spite of this, the Vice Chancellor indicated at a meeting of Academic Board on May 
25 that RTB would not be withdrawn, and the management wrote to staff threatening to 
deduct pay at a rate of 100 per cent for non-completion of marking duties. 
 
In the week that the industrial action began, the University And College Union  held meetings 
across the university to bolster support. On 2nd June 2016, the University And College Union  
Congress, meeting in Liverpool, passed a solidarity motion recognising the Newcastle issue 
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as “a local dispute of national significance” (available at 
https://www.UCU.org.uk/hesc16#HE54).  Newcastle  University And College Union  wrote 
to the Vice Chancellor offering an alternative to RTB, entitled ‘Improving Research 
Together’ and launched a petition on campaigning website change.org, ‘Say no to coercive 
performance management at Newcastle University’(available at 
https://www.change.org/p/chris-brink-say-no-to-coercive-performance-management-at-
newcastle-university). In response, the Vice Chancellor called an emergency Heads of 
Academic Meeting on Friday June 3, the day the industrial action began, where Head of 
Academic Unit supported the withdrawal of RTB. On Monday June 6, in negotiations with 
the University And College Union , management swiftly agreed to abandon RiPE and also 
discard the RTB terminology. Instead, drawing on the approach suggested in ‘Improving 
Research Together’ , management and union agreed to ‘develop a coming understanding and 
collegial approach to improving research’ (Academic Frameworks for Research 
Improvement, Newcastle University / University and College Union, June 6, 2016).We now 
go on to consider strategies of resistance to RTB, focussing in particular on the discursive 
critique of a set of documents which were themselves aimed at discursively remaking 
academic identities in Newcastle. 
 
Table 1: Timeline of events detailing the genesis and withdrawal of RTB 
 
July 2013 Raising the Bar (RTB) was first mentioned in the university Executive Board (EB) 
minutes. 
April 2014, The VC presented RTB to Council. 
January 2015 RTB steering group established. 
July 2015 Senate approved the key RTB initiative of faculty-specific sets of targets subsequently 
called ‘Research and Innovation Performance Expectations’ (RiPE). 
Early 
October 2015 
RiPE document emailed to all staff and all Heads of Academic Units called to a meeting 
and instructed immediately to embed research expectation for Faculty in all academic 
recruitment. 
21 October 
2015 
UCU Newcastle Branch President, Joan Harvey, writes to Vice Chancellor formally 
requesting withdrawal of RTB. 
28th October 
2015 
A UCU branch meeting approved an indicative ballot to see whether members would be 
willing to undertake industrial action to oppose RTB 
November 
2015 
Increasingly vocal opposition to RTB; open letters to management from Professoriate 
and a group of Geography academics 
February 
2016 
The branch indicated its willingness to consider industrial action. The university 
management formally engaged UCU in discussion about RTB, and drew up a 
Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) with UCU negotiators 
March 2016 A UCU branch meeting rejected the MOU.  
11th May 2016 A revised MOU is presented.  
18th May 2016 Professor Ed Byrne, VC of Kings College and former head of Monash, invited by Chris 
Brink to speak to Head of Academic Unit Forum on May 18 2016 about “The 
transformation of Monash to a World Top 100 University,” is seen to undermine RTB by 
arguing against ‘top-down’ management. 
23rd May 2016 The revised MOU is rejected by both the UCU branch committee and an Extraordinary 
General Meeting (EGM) of the branch. The EGM also voted to take Action Short of a 
Strike in the form of a marking boycott, authorised soon after by the UCU’s Higher 
Education Committee to begin on June 3. 
1st June 2016 Newcastle UCU wrote to the VC offering an alternative to RTB, entitled ‘Improving 
Research Together’ (IRT) and launched a petition on campaigning website change.org, 
‘Say no to coercive performance management at Newcastle University’ 
2nd June 2016 The UCU Congress, meeting in Liverpool, passed a solidarity motion recognising the 
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Newcastle issue as ‘a local dispute of national significance’. 
Friday 3rd 
June 2016 
Marking boycott begins. In response, the VC called an emergency Heads of Academic 
meeting to discuss the marking boycott. 
Monday 6th 
June 2016 
In negotiations with the UCU, management swiftly agreed to abandon RiPE and ditch 
the RTB terminology. 
 
 
ERASING ‘RAISING THE BAR’: UNPACKING STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE  
 
As our critical understanding of the impact on academic identities of neoliberal values in the 
accelerated academy has grown, so too has practical resistance to it. As we saw above, in 
June 2016 the research income performance expectations and the entire RTB agenda at 
Newcastle were withdrawn in response to vocal expressions of dissatisfaction across the 
university which culminated in industrial action. The positive outcome of this dispute was a 
rare example of a win by staff over a neoliberal management programme. Usually the trend is 
opposite, as university managers have been able to implement increasingly coercive and 
punishing performance management schemes with little or no sustained and effective 
opposition from staff. Consequently, as one element of our research we were keen to explore 
the tactics and strategies used by Newcastle academics to bring about this victory. What 
follows below is a summary of our findings based on interviews with the key activists who 
led the dispute. We discuss five main strategies, which emerged in our interviews as being 
most effective in shifting the balance of power in favour of the staff and the union: 
 
1. Organise and mobilise support 
The use of organised support was central to the success of the campaign against RTB.  
At Newcastle, the University and College Union (UCU) provided a significant degree 
of leadership necessary to communicate the grievance of the staff to management. 
Despite some internal differences in the Union committee, the activists organised 
under the auspices of the union to mobilise University And College Union  and non- 
Union   support for the cause. This was done primarily through meetings organised at 
school and departmental levels to bring together staff to listen to their anxieties and 
responses regarding RTB and to communicate the Union’s plans for opposition. These 
meetings were usually led by the Union representatives and were crucial in cementing 
a collective opposition to RTB early on. They were open to all staff regardless of 
whether they were members of the union or not.  As a direct outcome of these 
meetings, academic collectives met together and wrote open letters to their Pro Vice 
Chancellors and the Vice Chancellor expressing their concerns. 100+ professors 
drawn from all three faculties – roughly a quarter of the Professoriate – wrote a 
similar letter. These letters were instrumental in communicating to management the 
growing and widespread dissatisfaction of university staff with their initiative. 
Support was also sought from the student body by holding information sessions with 
students about the opposition to RTB - the students’ union newspaper, ‘The Courier,’ 
carried sympathetic articles (Velikova, 2015a; 2015b).  
 
2. Deconstruct management-speak 
It was recognised that to put forward a case for opposing RTB, the activists needed to 
deconstruct its policies. The opaque and vacuous nature of management-speak, as 
exemplified in metaphors such as ‘Raising the Bar’, can make opposition difficult. 
The activists felt that to have an effective opposition strategy they needed to 
deconstruct and expose the lack of substance behind measures such as RTB. Two 
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practical steps were taken, first; a linguist, Liz Morrish, from Nottingham Trent 
University (and co-author of this paper), was invited to conduct a discourse analysis 
of the RTB and RiPE documents to lay bare ‘the regime of punishment’, as one 
interviewee put it, which embodied these policies. Morrish presented her analysis in a 
public talk which energised the staff to oppose RTB. Her talk was followed by a 
productive question and answer session in which academics from different parts of the 
university exchanged ideas, made notes, swapped references, raised ideas for 
collective action, and began acquainting themselves with the scholarly literature 
onoutcomes-based performance management . Her talk, made available online 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1thgkQWV8t8) and widely circulated amongst 
staff, was instrumental in providing a vocabulary to critique RTB and place it in 
broader UK-wide contexts. Second, members of the union coordinated their 
attendance at management-organised meetings to press and challenge them on the ill-
thought through policies of RTB. These included high-profile ‘town hall’ meetings 
run by the Vice Chancellor, but also regular ‘Executive Board’ lunches, meetings with 
Faculty Pro-Vice Chancellors, and others. The dual strategy allowed activists to not 
only highlight to the management the intellectual, moral and practical shortcomings of 
their proposals, but also alerted them to declining employee morale. 
 
3. Publicize the story 
Since the RTB was primarily driven by a desire to raise Newcastle University’s 
reputation as a premier research institution, the activists felt that the management 
would be more receptive to their demands if they saw the university in the news for 
the wrong reasons. The news and social media platforms such as Times Higher 
Education Vice Chancellor and Facebook served to publicize the growing 
dissatisfaction and opposition to RTB. A public petition asking the Vice Chancellor to 
withdraw RTB was circulated via the website Change.org, highlighting that RTB had 
“unleashed a culture of bullying across the institution”. Within three days over 3,500 
people worldwide signed the petition urging Chris Brink to abandon RiPE in favour 
of ‘Improving Research Together’.  The activists also employed some more creative 
ways of publicizing their opposition to RTB.  University And College Union  
members were asked their opinions on RTB, and choice quotes were used in posters 
displayed around the university. One member started a pilot research project to 
document the impact of RTB measures by asking staff members to keep a diary of 
their thoughts and anxieties related to RTB measures in their department. With the 
permission of their respondents, anonymised quotes were drawn from these diaries 
and used by activists as evidence of the harm being done by RTB. The same project 
succeeded in getting public intellectuals who have written on the threat of 
neoliberalism to the humanities, such as Martha Nussbaum, Marilyn Strathern, Stefan 
Collini, and Rowan Williams to join its advisory board. Their very presence drew 
attention to the dispute and helped ensure it was more widely publicised. As one Head 
of Academic Unit told us, RTB damaged the university’s reputation, by “giving the 
impression that we are a hostile place.” Given that one key goal of RTB was raising 
the reputation of the university internationally, such attention risked undermining 
RTB by negatively damaging the reputation.  
   
4. Industrial action 
In the summer of 2016, after all the attempts at getting the university management to 
withdraw RTB had failed, the UCU moved towards industrial action in the form of 
Action Short of a Strike, principally a marking boycott. Our interviewees were keen 
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to stress that they believed this was the sharpest weapon against management in their 
arsenal, but also the one that they were most loath to employ because of the direct 
impact it would have on the students’ ability to graduate. However, when 
management refused to address their demands, the University And College Union  
branch members voted for Action Short of a Strike, precipitating a swift climb down 
on their part, and a successful resolution of the dispute in favour of the Union and its 
members. Many of the interviewees also stressed that the strategy of a marking 
boycott was perhaps the one which carried the most risk of failure if a critical 
majority of staff did not support it and that it was employed only as a last resort. 
Many members were uneasy with a marking boycott on principles of pedagogical 
ethics since a research matter such as RTB was being resolved by putting the 
students’ academic futures at risk.    
 
5. Articulate an alternative vision and vocabulary of excellence in academia 
The activists felt that they ‘fought hard but without bitterness’. It was important for 
them to not personalise the campaign as being against the Vice Chancellor and senior 
management, but rather saw it as a campaign against the forces of neoliberalisation 
and metricisation plaguing contemporary academia - to which management 
themselves were also victims. Thus, for example, key activists sought to maintain 
good relations with management in informal meetings, and the suggestion of voting 
on a motion of no-confidence in the VC was rejected. To this end, it was felt that an 
alternative vocabulary of excellence in academia was needed to counter the metric- 
heavy approach being used via RTB. An alternative to RTB was drafted under the 
title ‘Improving Research Together’ This recognised the need to be seen to perform 
well in key audit exercises, and asked management to withdraw RiPE and engage in 
the proposed ‘Improving Research Together’ alternative as, “an inclusive, collegial, 
evidence-based, bottom-up process to devise a non-coercive framework in which to 
foster a higher-performing research community” (Academic Frameworks for 
Research Improvement, Newcastle University / University and College Union, June 6, 
2016). In contrast to the competitive and punitive assumptions of RTB, this outlined 
the University And College Union  branch’s vision of a collegiate and co-operative 
research environment in which academics were given space for autonomy and 
creativity, and the steps needed to realise this in practice. Framed as a recognition of 
management concerns and an invitation to cooperate, ‘Improving Research Together’ 
set a constructive tone for the dispute and communicated to management that 
objections were not reactionary but progressive. This also allowed management to 
back down with dignity. 
 
The five strategies outlined above were identified by our interviewees as being central to the 
success of their resistance campaign. It would be misleading, however, to think of all 
resistance to RTB as part of a coordinated campaign led by University And College Union . 
Opposition occurred across different parts of the university from different actors with 
different agendas, both pragmatic and principled. For example, we know from our research 
with university managers (discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article), that 
middle managers (Heads of Academic Units) became increasingly critical of RTB behind the 
scenes. But this was as much for pragmatic reasons –although many agreed with the need to 
perform well in league tables, some resented the top-down model of RTB and the crude 
traffic-lights system that designated many of their staff as failures. Others regarded RTB as 
too blunt an instrument, as it did not recognise that different staff made different 
contributions to a collective whole in different ways. 
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A senior lay member told us of a “growing sense that more and more people were expressing 
opinions about this, at personal, individual, town hall levels, and the union was threatening 
strike action.” Serendipity also played a role. A number of middle managers and EB members 
highlighted the importance of the visit of Professor Ed Byrne,  Vice Chancellor of Kings 
College London and former head of Monash University, Australia, invited by Chris Brink to 
speak to the Heads of Academic Units Forum on May 18 2016 about “The transformation of 
Monash to a World Top 100 University.” One Head of Academic Unit said “He dropped a 
bombshell,” by saying “don’t do it top-down.” The professors’ letter was seen as “crucial” 
(middle manager) in representing the views of the “high-performing, senior academics” (EB 
member) upon whom RTB’s success was dependent. However this did not result in the 
withdrawal of RTB, but rather the creation of a ‘Forum.’ As one of the key authors of the 
letter said, “I thought we were being palmed off, there was no backtracking at all on 
RTB…industrial action was the tipping point.” It was, said a Head of Academic Unit, the  
University And College Union  industrial action seemed to prove the tipping point or 
“trigger”: it “raised the temperature and precipitated the final abandonment.”  
 
As the former VC, Chris Brink, declined our invitation for an interview, we have been unable 
to ascertain what led him to finally decide to withdraw RTB. But it seems that a combination 
of multiple forms of sustained opposition and criticism from a number of disparate actors 
across the university, some acting under  University And College Union  auspices and some 
without – as well as some serendipity – combined to render RTB ‘so toxic’, as an EB member 
told us in an interview. The  University And College Union  industrial action seemed to prove 
the tipping point. Thus whilst we recognise that local conditions vary and chance plays a part, 
we argue that the hard work of coordinated organisation, deconstruction of discourse, good 
media and rhetorical strategies, formal industrial action, and the articulation of a positive 
alternative vision to that of neoliberalism, all played crucial roles and could be profitably 
considered by other collectives facing similar examples of coercive neoliberal performance 
management.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
At a ‘town hall’ meeting on RTB in [November 2015], Newcastle University’s Vice 
Chancellor, Chris Brink, set out his methods of raising the university’s position in a variety of 
competitive league tables. These consisted of rewarding ‘excellent’ units and researchers with 
even more resources and  - although he didn’t foreground this aspect of RTB in his 
presentation –  concomitantly those scholars identified as ‘red’ by a traffic-lights system 
would face coercive performance management, and potential shifts to less favourable 
contracts. A  University And College Union  activist stood up and offered this objection: “In 
academia it is not individuals, departments, universities or countries that compete: the only 
thing that competes are ideas, for the benefit of humanity.” The Vice Chancellor fully agreed: 
as a mathematician, with a distinguished career prior to Newcastle in widening racial 
participation in higher education in post-Apartheid South Africa, he understood far better 
than his questioner both how metrics were deeply flawed and what universities are for. But he 
said that, nonetheless, in the current policy environment, there is no alternative, and RTB 
represented only a necessary means to achieve that end.  
 
We contend, however, with Rev Martin Luther King, Jr., that ‘we must come to see that the 
ends and the means must cohere.’ Outcomes-based performance-management is never simply 
an end: it inevitably leads to perverse unintended outcomes in gaming the system, but also 
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fundamentally transforms our understanding of what universities are and what academic 
labour is. Neoliberal outcomes-based performance-management schemes such as RTB, recast 
academic identities in ways that not only make universities less pleasant places to work in, 
but ultimately threaten the very environments and practices in which new the risky 
experimentation necessary for new ideas can take place. Outcomes-based performance-
management fails to recognise that academic staff are intrinsically motivated to perform well. 
Research (evidenced by the recent Newcastle experience) shows that RTB-like ‘carrot-and-
stick’ attempts to extrinsically motivate those who are already intrinsically motivated is 
counterproductive because it actually produces a reduction in overall motivation and job 
satisfaction (Pink, 2009). 
 
The Newcastle example shows that there is an alternative. The Newcastle action was not 
simply reactive against a bad idea; it invited managers and the whole university to envision 
an environment where reputation is improved not by playing the system, but by trusting its 
scholars enough to give them autonomy and the resources to be creative and innovative. At 
the time of writing, the post-RTB landscape at Newcastle remains unclear. But what 
happened there should be understood in the context of broader international movements: the 
San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA http://www.ascb.org/dora/) 
denouncing the (mis)use of journal metrics in performance management (Newcastle 
University became a signatory to DORA in 2017 – see minutes of Senate, 2nd May, 2017), or 
Aberdeen’s attempt to ‘Reclaiming our University’ 
(https://reclaimingouruniversity.wordpress.com/) by reinvigorating extant but degraded 
collegial mechanisms of governance, for example. There is an alternative: not just one, in 
fact, but plenty. 
 
Yet the RTB example perhaps provides even greater lessons for university managers than 
activists: show some collective fortitude. Managers know better than most of us that metrics 
are not only flawed and problematic in the higher education sector, but also monstrously 
inefficient in all the resources they consume for REF-preparation and other audit exercises. If 
they, collectively, refused to participate in league table exercises like the REF and TEF, the 
government would either have to back down or enact the immediate paralysis of almost the 
entire higher education sector in the UK. For any advanced economy, let alone one facing the 
unprecedented challenges of negotiating Brexit, that outcome would be unthinkable.   
 
So let’s indeed raise the bar. Let’s raise the bar for decency, humanity, respect and trust. Let’s 
remember that we can’t treat people like assets to be sweated, manipulated, and then 
dispensed with, without fundamentally dehumanising them and radically changing the 
identities of academics and universities. Let’s raise the bar for humane, supportive 
environments that allow learning and creativity to flourish. Let’s return to the inclusive 
meaning of ‘we’, and stop using ‘the university’ as shorthand for ‘the decisions of senior 
management.’ And, in asserting that there most definitely is an alternative, let’s be sure to 
maintain distinctive identities that are congruent with academic values of cooperation and 
fearless scholarly enquiry. We should not allow ourselves to be objectified and colonised to 
the extent that we cravenly try and jump over any bar set for us by middle or senior 
managers, funding bodies, or governments.   
 
18 
 
Acknowledgements  
We would like to thank all those staff of Newcastle University who agreed to be interviewed, 
and John Hogan, the University’s Registrar, for providing generous access to minutes and 
other archives from various university bodies and committees. 
Liz Morrish is an independent scholar. Her primary discipline is linguistics which she applies 
to the analysis of managerial discourse in universities.  Liz blogs at 
https://academicirregularities.wordpress.com/ 
The Analogue University is a writing collective of Newcastle University scholars. 
 
References 
 
Academic Analytics. (No date). Benchmarking for academic excellence. Retrieved from 
http://www.academicanalytics.com/  
Boys, J. (2017). LEO data (released 13/06/2017) earnings by subject and institution. 
Retrieved from https://public.tableau.com/profile/jonathan.boys#!/vizhome/LEOdata-
thirdrelease-
earningsbysubjectandinstitution/LEOdatareleased13062017earningsbysubjectandinstitution 
Bristol University Associate Dean of Eureka Moments. (2015). Retrieved from 
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/01/26/associate-dean-eureka-moments. 
Brown, R with Caruso, H. (2013). Everything for sale? The marketization of UK Higher 
Education. London: Routledge.  
Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: 
Zone Books.  
Becker, G. (1994).  Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special 
Reference to Education (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Burrows, R. (2012). Living with the h‐index? Metric assemblages in the contemporary 
academy. The Sociological Review 60 (2), 355-372. 
Carrigan, M. (2015). Accelerated Academy. Retrieved from https://markcarrigan.net/the-
accelerated-academy/ 
Deem, R., Hillyard, S., & Reed, M. (2007). Knowledge, Higher Education and the New 
Managerialism: The Changing Management of UK Universities. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Fairclough, N. (2010). Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (2nd ed.). 
London: Routledge.  
Fenton, N. (2011). Impoverished pedagogy, privatised practice, in M. Bailey & D. Freedman 
(eds). The Assault on Universities. London: Pluto Press, pp103-110. 
Fischer, F. (2003). Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
19 
 
Gill, R. (2010). Breaking the Silence: The Hidden Injuries of the Neoliberal University. In R. 
Ryan-Flood (ed). Secrecy and Silence in the Research Process: Feminist Reflections, pp 228-
244. London: Routledge. 
 
Glynos, J., Howarth, D., Norval, A. & Speed, E. (2009). Discourse Analysis: Varieties and 
Methods ESRC National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper: NCRM/014. 
 
Graeber, (2012). Of flying cars and the declining rate of profit. The Baffler, 19.  Retrieved 
from http://thebaffler.com/salvos/of-flying-cars-and-the-declining-rate-of-profit#left-menu  
Hall, R. & Bowles, K. (2016). Re-engineering higher education: the subsumption of 
academic labour and the exploitation of anxiety. Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labour 
28, 30-47.  
Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). 2017. Longitudinal Education 
Outcomes (LEO).  Retrieved from 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/news/newsarchive/2017/Name,114470,en.html 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). (2015). The Metric Tide: Report of 
the Independent Review of the Role of Metrics in Research Assessment and Management. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/rereports/Year/2015/metrictide/Title,104463,en.html   
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). (2014). REF FAQ. Retrieved from 
http://www.ref.ac.uk/faq/   
Holmwood, J. (2017). Requiem for the Public University. Retrieved from 
http://publicuniversity.org.uk/2017/05/02/requiem-for-the-public-university/ 
Hoyle, E. & Wallace, M. (2005). Educational Leadership: Ambiguity, Professionals and 
Managerialism. London: Sage. 
Lowe, T., & Wilson, R. (2015). Playing the Game of Outcome-Based Performance 
Management. Is Gamesmanship Inevitable? Evidence Form Theory and Practice. Social 
Policy and Administration.  DOI: 10.1111/spol.12205. e-print at 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/file_store/production/216988/95C608FE-8C45-4C9C-BF9D-
490D018E9B28.pdf  
Mather, K. & Seifert, R. (2014). The close supervision of further education lecturers: ‘You 
have been weighed, measured and found wanting.’ Work, Employment and Society 28 (1), 
95-111. 
Matthews, D. (2016) UK grant success rates prompt worldwide comparisons. Times Higher 
Education. October 16th. Retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/uk-
grant-success-rates-prompt-worldwide-comparisons  
Meyerhoff, M. (2004). Doing and saying: some words on women’s silence, in M.Bucholtz 
(ed.). Robin Lakoff: Language and Women’s Place, Text and Commentaries. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp 209-215.  
20 
 
Molesworth, M., Nixon, E., & Scullion, R. (2009). Having, being and higher education: the 
marketisation of the university and the transformation of the student into consumer. Teaching 
in Higher Education. 14 (3), 277-287.  
 
Molesworth, M., Nixon, E., Scullion, R., & Nixon, E. (eds). (2011). The Marketisation of 
Higher Education and the Student as Consumer. London: Routledge. 
 
Moore, S., Neylon, C., Eve, M.P., O’Donnell, D.P. & Pattinson, D. (2017) “Excellence R 
Us”: university research and the fetishisation of excellence. Palgrave Communications. 
3:16105 doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.105. http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/articles/palcomms2016105#ref10  
 
Morrish, L., & Sauntson, H. (2016). Performance management and the stifling of academic 
freedom and knowledge production. Journal of Historical Sociology 29 (1), 42-64.  
Nussbaum, M. (1995). Objectification. Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (4), 249–291.  
Parr, C. (2015). Stefan Grimm’s death leads Imperial to review performance metrics. Times 
Higher Education. March 27th.  Retrieved from 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/stefan-grimms-death-leads-imperial-to-review-
performance-metrics/2019381.article  
Petersen, E.B. (2016). The impact of managerial performance frameworks on research 
activities among Australian early career researchers. In K. Trimmer (ed.). Political Pressures 
on Educational and Social Research. NY: Routledge.  
Pink, D. (2009). Drive, the Surprising Truth about What Motivates Us New York: Riverhead 
Books. 
Power, M. (1999). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ritzer, G. (1993). The MacDonaldization of Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press 
(Sage). 
Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. (1997). Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies and the 
Entrepreneurial University. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Strathern, M. (2000). Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics, and 
the Academy. London: Routledge. 
The Analogue University. (2017). Control, Resistance and the ‘Data University’: Towards a 
Third Wave Critique. The Antipode Foundation retrieved from 
https://antipodefoundation.org/2017/03/31/control-resistance-and-the-data-university/ 
US Government Department of Education. (No date). College Scorecard. Retrieved from 
https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/  Accessed 18th April 2017. 
Velikova, A. (2015a). Research policy prompts protest. 23rd November 2015. Retrieved from   
http://thecourieronline.co.uk/2015/11/23/research-policy-prompts-protest/  
21 
 
Velikova, A. (2015b). ‘Raising the Bar’ causes concerns among staff. 14th December 2014. 
Retrieved from http://thecourieronline.co.uk/2015/12/14/raising-the-bar-causes-concerns-
amongst-staff/  
Williams, J. (2013). Consuming Higher Education: Why Learning Can’t be Bought. London: 
Bloomsbury.  
Williams, R. (2015). Annual Lecture to the Council for the Defence of British Universities, 
January 2015. Report in https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/rowan-williams-on-
higher-educations-inhuman-and-divisive-jargon/2018188.article 
 
 
 
